Three important challenges in the crime literature are to isolate significant causal effects of police on crime, to distinguish between deterrence and incapacitation, and to provide some estimate of the amount of displacement induced by visible deterrence activities. Following a terrorist attack on the main Jewish center in the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina, in July 1994, all Jewish and Muslim institutions (including schools, synagogues, mosques and clubs) were given 24-hour police surveillance. Thus, this hideous event induced a geographical allocation of police forces that can be presumed exogenous in a crime regression. Furthermore, induced changes in crime can only reflect deterrence effects. We collected data on the location of all car thefts for three large neighborhoods before and after the terrorist attack to study the effect of observable police on crime. Our estimates suggest that there is a large, negative, local effect of police presence on crime. We also find evidence of displacement: there is a positive and significant effect of police presence on the amount of car theft in the immediate surrounding area. The effects approximately cancel out, so there is no overall effect of observable police on crime.
I. Introduction
Classical criminology assumes that criminals are rational beings who weigh the costs and benefits of their actions. Becker (1968) produced the first fully-fledged theory of crime based on rational behavior and started an enormous literature in economics (see Ehrlich (1973) , Witte (1980) , McCormick and Tollison (1984) , Ehrlich and Brower (1987) , Andreoni (1991) , Freeman (1996) , Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) , Levitt (1997) , Fajnzylber et al (1999) , inter alia). One of the central predictions of the theory is that crime will fall when police presence increases. This is the basis of the main policy implications derived from this theory. A basic problem with this prediction is that it has largely failed to find empirical support. Cameron (1988) presents a survey of the literature. He reports that 18 out of 22 papers surveyed find either a positive effect of police on crime or no relationship between these variables using cross-city variations in the United States.
There are, however, two potentially serious problems with these studies. The first is that most of them look at data aggregated at the city level, so it is possible that changes in police presence have a negative effect on crime in one part of the city under study, and a positive effect on another part (crime is displaced). In such a case, the overall effect of police on crime at the city level may appear to be zero, or even positive, when in fact properly measured the local effect of police on crime is negative. The second problem arises from the simultaneous determination of crime and police presence (see Fisher and Nagin, 1978) . It is likely that the government of a city that experiences an increase in crime rates will choose to hire more police officers. Cities that have higher crime rates will have more police officers than those where crime is low. This will introduce a bias towards zero in the police coefficient in a crime regression. A recent paper that successfully corrects for such simultaneity bias is Levitt (1997) . He documents the presence of an electoral cycle in police hiring, and uses the timing of gubernatorial and mayoral elections to instrument for police presence in a panel of 59 large cities in the U.S. during the period 1970-92. The instrumented coefficients are consistently more negative than those obtained using OLS and the point estimates are negative for each of the seven categories of crime examined. The elasticity of violent crime with respect to sworn officers is -1.0 while that of property crime is -0.3.
While that paper represents a significant point of departure from previous work, Levitt (1997) points out a number of outstanding issues. First, since the timing of elections explains a small part of the variation in police hiring, the 2SLS estimates are imprecise making it difficult to draw policy conclusions. Second, he suggests that the timing of elections may affect crime through other variables than the number of police officers on the street. Controlling for the unemployment rate and spending on education and welfare programs, Levitt (1997) avoids some of these concerns, although there may be other channels through which the timing of elections could affect crime. Police effort and crime reporting (and not only police hiring) may respond to the timing of elections.
Or it could be that judges alter their behavior in times of elections (see Posner, 1995) .
Lastly, the focus is on the effect of police staffing on aggregate crime rates, so it is not possible to estimate displacement effects or to separate incapacitation versus deterrence effects.
In this paper we use a different approach to obtain an estimate of the exogenous effect of police on crime. On July 18 th , 1994, a terrorist attack exploded a bomb that completely destroyed A.M.I.A. (Asociacion Mutual Israelita Argentina), the main Jewish center in the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina. 86 people were killed and more than 300
were wounded in the attack. One week later, police protection was placed in front of each Jewish and Muslim institution (such as synagogues, mosques, clubs and schools) in the country. Since the distribution of these institutions can be presumed exogenous in a crime regression, this hideous event can be used as a natural experiment to break the simultaneous determination of crime and police presence. 1 The approach is promising as it allows us to estimate the effect of police on crime with no data on police staffing and distribution, information that is confidential and unavailable to the public in Argentina.
We collected information on the number of motor-vehicle thefts per block in three large neighborhoods in Buenos Aires before and after the terrorist attack. The information covers the nine-month period starting April 1 st and ending December 31 st , 1994. We also collected information on the location of each protected institution in these neighborhoods. We then estimate the effect of police presence on car theft. We find that blocks that receive police protection experience fewer car thefts than the rest of the neighborhood. The effect is economically large. Relative to the control group, it is equivalent to a drop of 59%. The drop in car thefts in the next block is equivalent to 20%.
Our estimates have two further advantages over previous work. First, there has been considerable interest in the literature in trying to distinguish the mechanisms that make increases in the police force reduce crime. One possibility is that more police officers on the streets deter crime because it makes such activities more risky (deterrence). Another possibility is that more police officers reduce crime because they catch more criminals leaving fewer of them around to commit crimes (incapacitation).
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Our approach is based on the deployment of observable policemen during a relatively brief period of time, not on changes over many years in the size of the police force that is dedicated to combat crime. Thus, all the effect of police on crime in our paper comes from deterrence.
A second advantage concerns displacement effects. The microstructure of our data allows us to study whether the reduced level of crime in these areas gets displaced to contiguous areas not covered by additional police. Most of the literature uses data on aggregate crime rates at the city level. Thus, one cannot be certain if any reduction in city crime is not compensated by some shifting of crime into neighboring areas. This makes policy experiments difficult. In our case we have an estimate of the effect of visible police presence on crime rates in neighboring areas. Our estimates do not reject the hypothesis that the total effect of observable police on crime is zero, when we considered the protected blocks and the immediate surrounding area.
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In a precise sense, our paper investigates the complementary set of questions to those asked in Ayres and Levitt (1998) , Lott and Mustard (1997), and Duggan (2000) .
2 Kessler and Levitt (1999) use sentence enhancement laws in California for a selected group of crimes to distinguish between incapacitation and deterrence. See also McCormick and Tollison (1984) , and Levitt (1998 They study the effect of the introduction of unobservable protection devices (Lojack and concealed handguns) with potentially positive externalities. In our case we estimate the effect of observable police presence, which may introduce negative externalities on neighboring areas. Our results are related to a set of important policy questions. One of them concerns whether the deployment of visible self-protection devices, such as private security guards in some neighborhoods or steering wheel locking bars in some cars, should be made taxable or regulated in order to address the market failure generated by the negative externalities. Our results can also be of use in the design of the optimal way to deploy police forces. For example, they could help answer the question of what role, if any, should be given to the use of police forces in plain clothes (i.e. not in uniform).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe our data and methods. In section III we present our main empirical results. Section IV concludes. Cornish and Clarke (1987) and Hesseling (1994) . 4 Ayres and Levitt (1998) report that in the U.S. it is unauthorized to make a Lojack protection system visible from the outside. The data used in this paper comes from three neighborhoods in the city of Buenos Aires. In terms of area, they represent around 3.2% of the city, while in terms of population they account for 6.9%. Each neighborhood is protected by one police station.
II. Data and Empirical Strategy
10 There were three criteria for selecting these three neighborhoods. First, they have the largest Jewish communities in the city. Second, a significant portion of these neighborhoods is not close to a protected institution (80% of the blocks are more than one block away from a protected institution), so that displacement effects can be evaluated at the micro level. Lastly, we thought three was the maximum number of neighborhoods that we could convince the police force to transfer the data to us, something that had to be done by manual means. 11 There are a total of 836 blocks and 45 protected institutions in this part of the city, 37 of which are actually inside these neighborhoods and the rest are near the boundaries (but less than three blocks away). Thus for every block in our sample, we know the proximity to the nearest Jewish institution, whether or not the latter are in the neighborhoods in our sample.
We obtained all the information available to the police (with the exception of the victim's name) regarding each auto theft in this area for the 9-month period starting April 1 st , 1994 and ending December 31 st of that year. This includes the address where the stolen car was parked, time of reported theft, car make and year, and whether the robbery was carried out with the use of violence. A total of 794 non-armed car thefts were reported for these neighborhoods during the period of analysis. 12 We exclude car thefts occurred between July 18 th and July 31 st . 13 Although thefts normally occur in blocks, in many cases they are reported at corners, as this facilitates the victim's verbal description of the crime at the time of filing the police report. We assigned car thefts reported at robbing a car and killing a person in the vicinity. Two similar events were reported in Villa Luro and Once (where a police officer protecting a Jewish institution was stabbed in a struggle with a thief who was carrying out a burglary of a grocery store nearby -the burglar was later arrested-). 10 For an in depth discussion of the institutional features of crime and the police force in Argentina, the reader is referred to Pelacchi (2000) . 11 The information was transferred manually from police records. For obvious privacy reasons, it is not normally available to the public, so a special authorization from the Chief of the Federal Police had to be obtained. 12 We concentrate on non-armed robberies. We also obtained information on a small number (63) of armed robberies.
corners to all the blocks of that intersection. 14 Using the report on the car make and year it was possible to construct an estimate of the car value using standard information from the used car market. The geographic structure of the information is summarized in Tables   A1 and A2 in the Appendix. Figure 1 shows a timeline of the events in our study. Information on self reported crime is usually considered unreliable, as there is a tendency to under-reporting. This problem is minor for car thefts in Buenos Aires for two reasons. Cars have mandatory insurance against accidents. The marginal cost of including insurance against car theft is low and there is a large perceived risk of having your car stolen. This means that the overwhelming majority of cars have insurance against theft. In order for this type of insurance to be activated police intervention is required. Second, criminals often use stolen cars to commit other crimes. By reporting the theft to the police, victims make sure that there can be no confusion about their involvement in these other crimes. A further advantage of auto-theft data is that this category of crime is expected to be more sensitive to street police presence. 15 It appears that most robberies (where a person is the victim) occur after a brief period of surveillance of the potential victim. 16 Concentrating their attention on the victim, they may miss the presence of police. With auto-theft, on the other hand, the potential victim (parked cars) is stationary and criminals gather some information on the area where they will commit crime.
We completed the data set by collecting information on the geography of these neighborhoods. Our first task was to obtain the exact location of all protected institutions and then to construct four measures of incremental distance from each block to the , a dummy taking the value 1 for blocks that are two blocks away from a protected institution, and in a straight line (SL) from the blocks that are one-block away from a Jewish institution, and zero otherwise. Finally, Institution 2 covers all the blocks that are two blocks away from a protected institution, both in a straight line and taking turns. Figure A1 in the Appendix explains the construction of the dummy variables for the protected institutions. 17 We also identified the geographical location of banks, embassies, public buildings, and gas stations in these neighborhoods.
II.B. Empirical Strategy
The empirical exercise exploits two important aspects of our data. First, it uses the fact that the distribution of police officers after the attack is exogenous to the distribution of crime. Second, it uses the fact that we have information on the number of crimes per block before and after the terrorist attack so that we can get rid of a number of unobservables that could affect the amount of crime. To give just one example, if crime is correlated with the location of a protected institution it could simply mean that Jewish institutions tend to be located in middle or high-income areas where there is more 16 Such criminals are said to operate "on the spot" (in Spanish this is called al boleo). All information regarding criminal modes gathered in interviews with key informants.
surveillance. The inclusion of block fixed effects allows us to control for such timeinvariant influences by focusing on changes in the amount of auto-theft over time.
We estimate the effect of police on crime controlling for time effects and unobservables, using the following regression:
where:
Rob it is the number of car thefts in block i in month t, M t is a month fixed effect,
Police# it = Institution# i *Post t indicates the presence of police protection,
Institution# i is a set of dummy variables that indicate the distance of block i to a protected institution (see Figure A1 ), and Post t is a dummy which equals 1 for August, September, October, November, and December, and 0 otherwise.
Finally, it is worth noting that we estimate the effect of police on crime without having direct data on the allocation of police forces (which is confidential). In our study, the presence of police forces is indicated by the distribution of the protected institutions after the terrorist attack. 17 None of the institutions in our sample is located at a corner.
III. The Effect of Police on Crime

III.A. Basic Estimates
The average number of car thefts per month per block from August through December for all the blocks that are more than two blocks away from a protected institution is 0.296. Relative to this average, car theft falls by 59% in the blocks that have a protected institution.
A potential objection is that may be drivers did not want to park near the protected institutions for fear of another terrorist attack. However, both the Embassy of Israel and the A.M.I.A. terrorist attacks were focused on the target buildings (the surrounding buildings in the block were not destroyed) so the main impact of fear of future attacks should concentrate on the parking spaces directly in front of the institution.
One should also emphasize that finding a legal parking spot in these neighborhoods is often very difficult, reducing the incidence of this problem. 18 A related issue is that, in practice, parking is restricted right in front of some of the protected institutions. To address these issues, we measured the average parking space in front of the institutions. It represents 11% of the total parking space of those blocks (considering both sides of the street). Under a linear relationship, this factor could explain a reduction in the number of car thefts of -0.032 (-0.11 times 0.296 -the average number of car thefts for the control group-). We reject at the 1% significance level that our estimated coefficient equals this value.
Regression ( It is interesting to note that the size of the effect is still relatively large at a distance that is on the limit of what is visible to the normal human eye. If the car thief is breaking into a car, it is unlikely that he/she will be spotted by a policeman on duty (for the case of an institution that is located exactly in the middle of the block) at a distance ranging from 50 to 150 meters. For example, in the relatively more affluent neighborhoods in Buenos Aires, booths for security guards are placed 100 meters away from each other. 19 If private agents place protection making sure that all parts of the block are covered (i.e. that there are no blind spots) and there are no advantages to having a section of the block protected by two security guards (i.e. with overlapping protection), this suggests that the maximum protection distance is around 50 meters, the distance from the security guard's booth to the house under his/her surveillance that is farthest away.
In columns (C) and (D) we repeat the analysis excluding the blocks where there were no thefts throughout the period of analysis. If for unobservable reasons, there are blocks in which car thefts do not occur, the introduction of police protection in those blocks will have no effect, as the number of car-thefts is already bounded at zero. The inclusion of these blocks in our study would depress the estimated effects. There were 213 such blocks (24% of our sample). As expected, the estimated coefficients are larger (more negative) when we exclude the no-theft blocks. The statistical significance is similar to that shown in columns (A) and (B). The same-block effect is again more than three times larger than the one-block away effect. Excluding the blocks with no thefts throughout the sample period, the average number of monthly car thefts per block from
August through December for all the blocks that are more than two blocks away from a protected institution is 0.389. For blocks showing at least one car-theft during the period of analysis, police presence causes a 72% decline in car thefts relative to the control group. The negative effect of police on car thefts taking place in the next block is 20%.
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19 Note that such guards are mainly deployed to protect the houses in the block against burglaries, and forcible entry into a house is more visible than forcible entry into a car. 20 Our results are also robust to estimation using count models (such as Poisson and Negative Binomial). Results available upon request.
III.B. Displacement Effects and Policy Discussion
A standard issue in the crime literature concerns the possibility that criminals that are deterred from committing a crime in a certain area move and commit crimes in another area. By the nature of the data available (aggregated, for example, at the city level), previous research has found it difficult to control for such geographical displacement.
Note that it is hard to draw strong policy conclusions without such an estimate, as the benefits of lower crime in one area have to be compared to the costs of higher crime in the displaced areas. Our approach can provide some estimates of displacement effects that are relevant to this type of policy questions. Table 2 Column (D) in Table 2 uses a more generous measure of distance to the police. 21 Similar conclusions emerge from studying the sub-sample of blocks for which there was at least one car theft during the sample period.
It is important to make clear our interpretation of the results. There are three possibilities: no deterrence, deterrence with no displacement, and deterrence with displacement. If there is no deterrence, then there should be no effect of Police 0 (or of Police 1), so this hypothesis can be rejected. If there were deterrence with no displacement, one would expect that there would be a decline in crime in blocks 0 and 1 relative to the non-treatment group, and then a uniform behavior in all the other blocks.
This means that we should not observe a positive and significant coefficient on Police 2 (or Police 2 SL ), so this hypothesis can also be rejected. The pattern we observe is only possible it there were deterrence with displacement.
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Note that the pattern of displacement that we find is inconsistent with endogeneity in the selection of the policemen that take part in the protection duties. Our natural experiment starts from the assumption that the protection of the Jewish institutions is exogenous to the pattern of crime. But it could be argued that policemen are not added, but reshuffled, and that they are taken from areas with little crime and then assigned to the protected institutions. This alternative argument would be consistent with our results only if the low crime areas were located at exactly two blocks from the protected institutions and police were redeployed from those blocks (and not from anywhere else)
to blocks 0 and 1, a very unlikely event and one that has been explicitly denied by our key informants.
It is interesting to speculate on the possible reasons for this pattern, whereby police presence displaces crime to nearby areas rather than to far away areas. 23 One possibility is simply that there are search costs involved in travelling to the area where the crime will be committed and finding a potential victim. Once the criminal observes the police in front of the protected institution, he/she moves to the nearby area because it is cheaper than going further away and there are no obvious benefits. Furthermore, it may be a consequence of the time frame of our study in the sense that it may take time for criminals to adapt and find other suitable areas to operate and we are only analyzing the first few months after the attack. It is also possible that criminals "specialize" in a small 22 What is particularly convenient is that we find displacement to the immediately surrounding area. Note that even if Police 2 were zero, we would still be unable to reject the hypothesis of uniform displacement to the rest of the neighborhood. 23 Displacement could take place to other types of crimes, such as burglaries.
geographic area. There may be advantages in having specific knowledge on a particular area (like flight routes, hiding places or drivers' parking patterns). These would make it preferable for thieves that usually "work" in a certain geographic area to move to another block but stay in the same vicinity when they know that a block is protected. Maybe criminals prefer to be away from a policeman when committing a crime but to be able to predict their movements. The presence of policemen stationed in front of the institutions (from where they are not supposed to move) introduces an element of predictability to police presence. Lastly, it is also possible that gang arrangements divide the city making dangerous for thieves to move to other thieves' turf.
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The results can be used to estimate the total effect of police presence on car thefts for the protected block and the surrounding area. Using the estimates presented in Column (C) in Table 2 , we cannot reject at conventional levels of significance that the total police effect is zero when we consider the protected block, the six one-block-away blocks, and the six two-blocks-away-in-straight-line blocks. Similar results are obtained using the estimates from Column (D) in Table 2 for a more extended area. These results suggest that placing a visible police officer in a fixed, known location has no deterrent effect on total car theft in the neighborhood. The large, negative effect in the protected area seems to cancel out with the increase in car-theft in the immediate surrounding area. , 1999, for a description of the activities of the so-called "Taxis mafia". 25 Our key informants have emphasized in interviews that it is well understood in police circles that the probability that a policeman on patrol actually witnesses a crime being committed is quite low. The most likely case is that somebody who has witnessed the crime calls the police to intervene. that for a full cost-benefit analysis we should also consider the cost of police presence. Since a policeman in Buenos Aires earns on average a monthly wage of 800 dollars, and policemen work eight-hour shifts and around 21 days per month, the monthly cost of providing police protection is approximately U$3,500 per location. Table 2 compare the change in car-theft zero, one and two blocks away from the institutions relative to the change in car-theft in the more-than-two-block-away area. However, it is possible that the more-than-twoblock-away area has also suffered displacement up to some level. If displacement generated an increase in car-theft in that area, then, by comparing the change in the number of car thefts relative to an inflated baseline, our estimates may be overestimating the local benefits of crime reduction and underestimating the displacement costs. Thus, our estimates of no-overall effect of police on crime could represent an optimistic description if there is some amount of displacement towards the non-immediate surrounding area.
The results in Columns (C) and (D) of
These results have policy implications for other forms of observable crime deterrence activities such as those related to private protection. Ayres and Levitt (1998) cite sources showing the economic importance of private expenditures to reduce crime in the US and how such private spending has outgrown public spending over the recent past. This is also true in many developing countries, including Argentina. This sector is largely unregulated, particularly outside the US. In most countries that we know of, citizens are free to hire visible private protection. Our results show that such activities can shift crime to other areas, suggesting that perhaps some form of taxation or regulation may be appropriate to address these negative externalities. Our results also provide some rationale for why law enforcement agencies condition the acceptance of the Lojack technology on the actual device not being observable from outside of the car (this is reported in Ayres and Levitt, 1998) .
A related question concerns the convenience of deploying police forces in a visible way (for example, the proportion of uniformed versus plain-clothes agents). From the point of view of car thefts, visible police protection seems to have a strong local effect with large enough displacement effects so that no overall police effect can be appreciated. But these estimates are obviously insufficient to conclude that deployment of visible police protection is bad from a welfare point of view. Such analysis would require us to obtain some estimate of the benefits to the typical citizen of observing the police protection (and being reminded of their presence), as well as the benefits to risk averse individuals who value knowing if they have police protection or not. Also, visible police protection could make reporting crimes to nearby police easier for victims and bystanders. 26 Furthermore, it would also be important to compare our results with those obtained in studies designed to evaluate the effect of unobservable police in a known location, and in studies designed to estimate the effect of mobile but observable police before drawing more general policy conclusions.
III.C. Further Tests
In this section we present further tests and extensions that help assess the validity of our approach. First we investigate if the blocks that are close to a Jewish institution exhibit a different crime dynamic in the period before the terrorist attack. To do this we simply reestimate our coefficients using a sample that starts on April 1 st but that ends on July 17 th (just before the terrorist attack takes place). We then imagine a fictitious "terrorist attack"
taking place at the middle of this sub-sample period. Thus, we repeat the same exercise as before, but with a reduced sample period and redefining the dummy variable Post to take the value 1 for June and July (the first 17 days) and zero for April and May. The results in Table 3 provide some validation to our exercise in the sense that they show that no special crime dynamics affected our treatment group prior to the attack. The results are similar if other alternative cutoff dates for the dummy variable Post are used (end of
April or end of June).
We also analyze the differential deterrent effect of police presence by time of the day, day of the week, and value of the car in Tables 4 through 6. Table 4 shows that the police effect seems to be stronger during the day than during the night. The difference is significant for the same-block effect. One potential explanation is that the public is more likely to be able to monitor the activities of the policeman during the day, as there are more people on the street. In some sense, during the day the policeman is "under 26 It is unclear how important such considerations should be. Remember that everybody would know that police officers are not visible. Thus we could expect that a simple norm to identify police officers in plain clothes would emerge, as has happened in similar social settings. For example, when an adult finds a small child that has gotten lost in a crowded place (such as a beach), he/she starts clapping and places the child on his/her shoulders. Soon most of the people around are clapping. Upon hearing this, parents check where their own children are until the parents of the child identify themselves. This norm is useful because the parents of the lost child are not observable to the adult that has found the lost child, just as the police in plain clothes are not observable to the person wishing to report a crime. It is also very cheap.
supervision" and must exert effort and be alert. Table 5 suggests that the effect of police presence is higher during weekdays than during weekends. The difference is similar in size to the day-night effect, although it is less well determined. Table 6 suggests that the coefficients also display the expected pattern when the sample is divided according to the value of the stolen cars. When there is a policeman present, the thieves will risk it only for a more expensive loot. The coefficients on the effect of police presence for expensive car thefts are smaller (less negative) than in the regression restricted to cheap cars, although the difference is not statistically significant.
In some of the blocks in which police protection was placed after the bombing, some source of crime protection was already in place. In Table 7 , we compare the effect of the additional police protection in blocks where there is a bank, a public building (including foreign embassies), or a gas station relative to other protected blocks in which these buildings are not present. The first two cases (bank and public building) indicate that there was already some police presence in the block (although only during office hours for the bank and often inside the building). In the last case, the gas station implies significant light and movement during the whole day. As expected, we find that the effect of additional police protection tends to be weaker when there were previous sources of crime protection in the same block. The difference, however, is not statistically significant.
IV. Conclusions
Three important challenges in the economics literature on crime started by Becker (1968) are to obtain an estimate of the effect of exogenous increases in police presence, to differentiate between incapacitation and deterrence, and to provide an estimate of how much increased police presence in one area displaces crime to neighboring areas. In this paper we tackle these questions using a natural experiment.
On July 18 th , 1994, a terrorist cell exploded a bomb that completely destroyed the main Jewish center in the city of Buenos Aires killing 86 people and wounding more than 300. After the attack, a police officer was placed in front of each Jewish and Muslim institution in the country. Since the distribution of these institutions can be presumed exogenous in a crime regression, it is possible to use this hideous event to break the simultaneous determination of crime and police presence. We collected data on the exact location of car thefts in three neighborhoods in the city of Buenos Aires before and after the attack. Focusing on the geographic distribution of crime, it is easy to obtain estimates of displacement. Also, by construction, our estimates can only reflect deterrence (not incapacitation) effects.
We find a large, negative and local deterrent effect of police presence on car theft.
Blocks that receive police protection experience 0.173 fewer car thefts than blocks that do not receive police protection. The average number of car thefts per block after the attack for our control group is 0.296, so police protection induces a fall in auto theft of approximately 59%. Blocks that are one block away from where such protection is provided experience 0.059 fewer car thefts than the rest of the neighborhood. Thus, in blocks that are close to police protection there are 20% fewer car thefts.
Our estimates also allow us to provide a measure of the amount of auto-theft that is displaced to less protected areas. Blocks that are two blocks away from police protection have around 0.055 more car thefts than the rest of the neighborhood. This represents a 19% increase relative to the control-group level. We cannot reject at conventional significance levels that the total effect of observable police presence on car theft is zero. The negative police effect in the closest area seems to cancel out with the increase in car-theft in the immediate surrounding area.
The police technology considered in this study, the use of uniformed policemen in a fixed location, resembles exactly the features of the private armed security often hired to protect firms and high-income households. The generalization of our results suggests that these security guards may induce significant negative externalities on the surrounding area. This market failure may generate an overprovision of private security by the free market. th and July 31 st are excluded. Protection equals 1 when a Bank (Column A), a Public Building (Column B) or a Gas Station (Column C) is located in the block, and 0 otherwise. tstatistics are in parentheses. † Null hypotheses: Police 0 * (1 -Protection) = Police 0 * Protection. ‡ Null hypothesis: Police 1 * (1 -Protection) = Police 1 * Protection. * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level.
Appendix:
